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Abstract
In this paper we argue that in contrast to the conclusion of Artis and Zhang,
there is not much evidence in support of the view that increased exchange
rate stability is related to more synchronised business cycles in Europe.
This finding may have important consequences, as existing differences in
business cycles in the EMU-countries may not disappear due to further
monetary integration, making a common monetary policy hazardous.
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The Economic and Monetary Union in Europe (EMU) has been criticised because
differences in business cycles in the EMU-countries may make a common monetary policy
hazardous. The traditional Optimal Currency Area (OCA) literature suggests that in case of
substantial divergence, the benefits of a common currency may not exceed the cost of giving
up monetary sovereignty. Until quite recently most authors concluded that the divergence
among the EMU member countries was so high and the flexibility of labour markets so low,
that EMU as it exists now was considered not to be optimal (see Eijffinger and De Haan,
2000 for further discussion).
No matter how important asymmetric shocks have been in the past, in assessing the
economic case for EMU the crucial question is how likely these shocks will be in the future.
Two views have been put forward on this issue. According to a study by the European
Commission (Emerson et al., 1992) further economic and monetary integration will lead to
less divergence, i.e. income and employment will tend to diverge less between the countries
involved. However, Krugman (1991) poses the opposite. He argues that trade integration
will lead to regional concentration of industrial activities. In Europe a similar concentration
of industries will take place as in the US (e.g. Silicon Valley). This concentration process is
caused by economies of scale. Trade in Europe will change from intra-industry trade to inter-
industry trade. Due to this concentration process, sector-specific shocks may become region-
specific shocks, thereby increasing the likelihood of asymmetric shocks. Figure1
summarises both views (De Grauwe, 1997).
Fig. 1 Two views on the relationship between economic and monetary integration and
divergence
Divergence





Which view is correct? Some recent research provides support for the view that more economic
and monetary integration will lead to less divergence. For instance, Artis and Zhang (1997;
1999)
1 find that over time the business cycle affiliation of most countries participating in the
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System has shifted from the United
States to Germany.
2 Although Artis and Zhang are more careful in interpreting their results
3, De
Grauwe (1997, pp. 74-5) summarises their findings as follows: "the business cycles of EU
countries has become much more correlated since the early 1980s. Thus there are now fewer
asymmetric shocks among a relatively large group of EU countries than 15 years ago. The
authors credit the European Monetary System (EMS) for this. The EMS has forced countries to
follow similar monetary policies. In so doing it has reduced the possibility of following
independent monetary policies. The latter are a major source of asymmetric shocks. This seems
to confirm what we said earlier, i.e. that with economic integration the occurrence of
asymmetric shocks tends to diminish."
In this paper we shed some doubt on the results of Artis and Zhang. First, we
distinguish more than two periods in comparing cycle synchronicity and exchange rate
stability. Second, we show that there is no systematic relationship between cycle
synchronicity and exchange rate stability. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.
The next section outlines the methodology. Section 3 presents our results and the final section
offers some concluding comments.
2.  Methodology
Artis and Zhang (1997; 1999) conclude that the countries participating in the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS since March 1979 have changed their business cycle
affiliation. From 1961 to 1979 these countries had business cycles which tended more
towards the US business cycle. In the period after the institution of the ERM they tended
more towards the German cycle. This effect does not occur for non-ERM countries like
Canada or Japan. Using seasonally adjusted monthly OECD data on industrial production
Artis and Zhang  calculated a cyclical index for each series, which takes the following form:
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Xt is the raw series and trendt is the detrended series. In their 1997 paper, they used several
filters to detrend the series. These filters were the Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP filter, with a l
of 50000 and 500000), a filter used by the OECD and a linear trend. In Artis and Zhang
(1999) only OECD filtered data are used. Next, Artis and Zhang compared the correlation
between a country’s cyclical index and the US and German cyclical index. Artis and Zhang4
(1999) also define a measure for exchange rate volatility: the standard deviation of the
logarithm of the exchange rate at t=1 divided by the exchange rate at t=0. They report the
rank correlation between business cycle correlation and exchange rate volatility. This too
leads them to conclude that during the ERM period a European business cycle has emerged.
In our view, from the EMU perspective, it is not so interesting whether the business
cycle in a particular country is affiliated to the US cycle or to the German cycle. The main
issue is whether exchange rate volatility has led to synchronisation of business cycles in
Europe. Therefore, we do not report the correlation with the US cycle.
4 Instead, we compare
the correlation with the German cycle before and after the institution of the ERM. We have
calculated the correlations in the same way as Artis and Zhang. We use almost the same
countries as Artis and Zhang (1999): Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. We excluded Portugal
because the data was too unreliable. We have used seasonally adjusted monthly figures for
industrial production from the  International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF.
5 For
Denmark, Ireland and Switzerland the series were not long enough for monthly data, so we
resorted to quarterly data. All our series start in January 1960 except Spain (in 1961),
Switzerland (1965) and Denmark (1968). All our series end in December 1998. To detrend
these series, we have used a HP filter with l=50000. This filter takes the following form :
In this formula yt represents the series and gt the growth component. The first part is the
cyclical component and the second part the trend. When  l goes to infinity, the formula
converges to a linear trend. For monthly data Hodrick and Prescott suggest using l=14400.
Artis and Zhang used  l=50000 and  l=500000. They justify this arguing that industrial
production is very volatile and the trend is usually upwards. For our research we have
followed Artis-Zhang and use  l=50000. For Denmark, Ireland and Switzerland (quarterly
data) we have used l=5555.
6 After detrending the series, we calculated the cyclical index like
Artis and Zhang and computed the correlations between each country’s index and the German
index.
Apart from calculating the correlation for the periods 1960:1-1979:3 and 1979:4-
1998:12 we also distinguish four sub-periods because the two periods are not uniform with
respect to exchange rate volatility. It is not true that before 1979 ERM currencies had a
volatile exchange rate with respect to the Deutsche Mark while during the ERM these rates
were stable. Up to 1971 the Bretton-Woods system was still in place, insuring quite stable
exchange rates. From 1971 to 1979 an unstable exchange rate system was in place in Europe





t t t t
t
N


















(the so-called Snake-in-the-tunnel). In March 1979 the ERM was instituted but until 1987
many realignments occurred. After the Basle-Nyborg agreement of September 1987 further
realignments were avoided up to 1992 (apart from the technical adjustment of the Italian lira
in January 1990). In August 1992 the ERM was hit by a speculative crisis, which forced the
Pound Sterling and the Lira out of the system. Therefore, we have also compared business





Each of these periods is long enough to capture a full business cycle, but gives a more
accurate division with respect to exchange rate volatility. We have also examined a further
division of the full sample period.
We present the correlations between the cyclical component of output of all countries
vis-à-vis Germany and examine whether patterns have changed over time. We will do this for
two periods (pre ERM and post ERM) and for the four periods outlined above. As a second
step, we present simple scatter diagrams of actual exchange rate volatility (defined as in Artis
and Zhang) and the degree of business cycle homogeneity with Germany.
3.  Results
We start with a comparison of the business cycle synchronisation before and during the ERM
for 19 OECD countries. As Table 1 shows, there are some striking differences with the results
of Artis and Zhang. It is especially remarkable that there is no general increase in correlation
between Germany and the other  ERM-countries after the institution of the ERM. While some
countries show an increase in correlation (France, Ireland, Italy), others have a lower
correlation (Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). A decline in the
correlation was to be expected for non-ERM countries, as DM-exchange rates with those
countries were not especially stable in the post 1979 period. For ERM countries however, this
comes as a surprise. It certainly is at odds with the findings of Artis and Zhang.
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Table 1. A comparison between our results and the results in Artis and Zhang
Inklaar-DeHaan Artis-Zhang 97 Artis-Zhang 99













Austria 0.61 0.62 -- -- 0.68 0.78
Belgium 0.54 0.49 0.66 0.50 0.58 0.74
Canada 0.48 0.28 0.50 0.17 0.48 0.14
Denmark 0.74 0.35 -- -- -- --
Finland 0.28 0.26 0.37 -0.04 0.34 -0.08
France 0.48 0.67 0.55 0.59 0.48 0.65
Greece 0.56 0.25 -- -- 0.32 0.48
Ireland 0.34 0.47 0.38 0.17 0.48 0.04
Italy 0.20 0.39 0.15 0.33 0.15 0.56
Japan 0.52 0.54 0.52 0.62 0.49 0.76
Luxembourg 0.62 0.46 -- -- 0.64 0.54
Netherlands 0.75 0.42 0.62 0.59 0.78 0.80
Norway 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.26 0.13 0.37
Portugal -- -- 0.28 0.29 0.47 0.65
Spain 0.39 0.42 0.38 0.24 0.38 0.51
Sweden 0.34 0.42 0.35 0.27 0.27 0.16
Switzerland 0.78 0.57 -- -- 0.40 0.16
United Kingdom 0.58 0.28 0.58 0.08 0.61 0.35
United States 0.43 0.28 -- -- -- --
Note: the results of Artis & Zhang (1997) are those with l=50000 in the Hodrick-Prescott filter (taken from their
table 1); in our calculation we have also used l=50000. The results of Artis & Zhang (1999) are with data filtered
by the OECD and taken from their table 1.
As we have followed Artis-Zhang in almost all possible respects, only two possible
explanations for the differences exists:
1.  We have used data from the IMF while Artis and Zhang (1997, 1999) used OECD data.
As explained before, we only could only acquire the necessary data from the IMF.
2.  In our research the post-ERM period is longer than in Artis and Zhang.
As the first possibility should not lead to large differences, we disregard it. To deal with
the second possibility, we have redone our calculations focusing on the same sample periods
as in Artis and Zhang (1997, 1999). The results are presented in Table 2. It follows that
substantive differences remain.7








Austria 0.61 0.67 0.66
Belgium 0.54 0.58 0.52
Canada 0.48 0.26 0.28
Denmark 0.74 0.39 0.37
Finland 0.28 0.22 0.24
France 0.48 0.67 0.68
Greece 0.34 0.29 0.27
Ireland 0.56 0.46 0.46
Italy 0.20 0.41 0.41
Japan 0.52 0.63 0.61
Luxembourg 0.62 0.49 0.46
Netherlands 0.75 0.48 0.47
Norway 0.18 0.17 0.16
Portugal -- -- --
Spain 0.39 0.40 0.42
Sweden 0.34 0.42 0.44
Switzerland 0.78 0.56 0.56
United Kingdom 0.58 0.28 0.29
United States 0.43 0.28 0.28
Note: the sample period in the third column corresponds to that of Artis & Zhang (1997), while that in the fourth
column corresponds to the sample period in Artis & Zhang (1999).
As we mentioned above, a division of the entire sample period into four sub-periods may be
more appropriate than into two periods. For all four periods as distinguished in the previous
section, we have calculated the cyclical correlations with Germany. Table 3 shows the
average correlation per period.8










Austria 0.55 0.68 0.62 0.62
Belgium 0.37 0.74 0.53 0.47
Canada 0.23 0.74 0.54 -0.12
Denmark 0.75 0.77 0.42 0.32
Finland 0.27 0.29 0.37 0.20
France 0.26 0.82 0.59 0.74
Greece 0.15 0.58 0.45 0.05
Ireland -0.08 0.77 0.48 0.47
Italy -0.27 0.64 0.44 0.35
Japan 0.16 0.87 0.58 0.52
Luxembourg 0.62 0.69 0.62 0.29
Netherlands 0.79 0.76 0.46 0.38
Norway 0.27 0.11 0.25 0.09
Spain 0.22 0.61 0.22 0.56
Sweden 0.52 0.13 0.46 0.38
Switzerland 0.91 0.77 0.56 0.58
United Kingdom 0.59 0.61 0.41 0.09
United States -0.01 0.80 0.50 -0.07
Note: the precise sample periods are stated in the text.
As can be seen, most ERM countries show an increase in the correlation during the period
1971-79, while in the period 1979-87 the correlations decline.
8 This development is certainly
not in line with the view that further monetary integration and business cycle synchronisation
are related. To analyse this issue somewhat further we have examined the relationship
between exchange rate volatility and business cycle synchronisation. Using the same
definition of exchange rate volatility as Artis-Zhang for the four periods that we have
distinguished and using the correlations shown in table 3 we have made a simple scatter
diagram (see Figure 2).9
Fig. 2. The relationship between business cycle correlation and exchange rate volatility for every country and
every period
The scatter graph does not show a clear relationship between cycle correlation and exchange
rate stability. If such relationship were present a country like Canada would be expected to
have a large exchange rate volatility (no effort is being made to stabilise the Canadian $ / DM
rate) coupled with low correlation. The French exchange rate volatility is much lower, so a
higher correlation would be expected. The lack of a relationship is confirmed by the
regression output as only the constant term is significant and the explanatory power is almost
zero (not shown). So also with this comparison between business cycle correlation and
exchange rate stability we cannot conclude that exchange rate stability is related to cycle
synchronisation. There might be a difference and a relationship if only ERM countries are
considered. Fig. 3 shows a scatter graph for ERM countries only.






















Fig. 3. The relationship between business cycle correlation and stability for ERM countries in each period.
Our conclusion remains the same if we consider ERM countries separately. In this case a
significant relation between exchange rate stability and cycle correlation is also absent.
4.  Concluding comments
In this paper, we have tried to give an answer to the question of whether exchange rate
stability is related to business cycle synchronisation. This is an important question, as it may
give an indication of the frequency of asymmetric shocks in the EMU and such shocks may
have large effects on the cohesion of the monetary union. Artis and Zhang have found a
relationship between stability of exchange rates in Europe and the real linkage between the
ERM countries and Germany. They reached this conclusion from their observation of a shift
in business cycle affiliation. During the ERM, the countries that were in the ERM had a
business cycle more closely resembling the German cycle than the US cycle. This was not the
case in the pre-ERM period (1961-1979).
In this paper we have made two contributions. First, we have tried to replicate the
results of Artis and Zhang using IMF instead of OECD data on industrial production, focusing






















on the business cycle affiliation with Germany as this is from the EMU perspective the more
interesting. Although we have followed Artis and Zhang in all other respects, their results
differ substantially from ours. Focusing on the entire sample period, there is no clear-cut trend
among ERM countries. Whereas some countries have a more similar business cycle with
Germany after the establishment of the ERM, others show a decline in business cycle
synchronisation. This conclusion also holds if we employ exactly the same sample periods as
Artis and Zhang (1997; 1999). Second, in our view the period 1960-1998 should be divided
into in more sub-periods as each period displays different characteristics with regard to
exchange rate stability. In the ERM, exchange rates were not uniformly stable just as rates in
the pre-ERM period were not fully flexible. Finally, after we combined our measure of real
integration (correlation between business cycles) with our measure of monetary integration
(exchange rate volatility) no systematic relationship could be found. This result also holds
when non-ERM countries were excluded.
Our results do not support the view that exchange rate stability is related to business
cycle synchronisation. This is not to say that further integration in Europe may not affect
business cycle synchronisation. There may be other mechanisms than exchange rate stability
that lead to this. Frankel and Rose (1998) find a strong relationship between trade links and
cycle synchronicity. These authors have estimated equations that take several measures of
trade intensity as independent variables and the correlation between business cycles as
dependent variables. Their estimations yield highly significant parameters. This is good news
for the EMU, as trade continues to grow within Europe. Interestingly, when Frankel and Rose
include a dummy variable, which is one when two countries have linked their currencies and
zero otherwise, its coefficient is not significant. This result is in line with our findings. In
addition, Baxter and Stockman (1989) find no effect of the exchange rate on business cycle
synchronisation.12
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Appendix
Table A1 summarises tables 1 and 2 by focusing on the change in the business cycle
synchronisation before and after the start of the ERM.












Austria 0.01 0.07 0.05 -- 0.10
Belgium -0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.16 0.16
Canada -0.20 -0.22 -0.21 -0.33 -0.34
Denmark -0.39 -0.35 -0.37 -- --
Finland -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.41 -0.42
France 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.04 0.17
Greece -0.31 -0.05 -0.07 -- 0.16
Ireland 0.13 -0.10 -0.10 -0.21 -0.44
Italy 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.41
Japan 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.27
Luxembourg -0.16 -0.13 -0.16 -- -0.10
Netherlands -0.33 -0.27 -0.28 -0.03 0.02
Norway 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.12 0.24
Portugal -- -- -- 0.01 0.18
Spain 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.14 0.13
Sweden 0.08 0.08 0.10 -0.08 -0.11
Switzerland -0.21 -0.22 -0.22 -- -0.24
United Kingdom -0.30 -0.30 -0.29 -0.50 -0.26
United States -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -- --
As  pointed out in the main text, the ERM went through various phases. In fact, the following
six periods may be distinguished (see also Eijffinger and De Haan, 2000):
I 1/1960 – 5/1971: The Bretton-Woods system still functioned, thus ensuring relatively stable
exchange rates.
II 6/1971 – 3/1979: During this period, Europe had essentially free-floating exchange rates.
III 4/1979 – 12/1983: This period saw a turbulent start of the ERM with many realignments.
IV 1/1984 – 9/1987: A calmer intermediate phase with few realignments.
V 10/1987 – 8/1992: After the Basle-Nyborg agreement a very calm period without
realignments.
VI 9/1992 – 12/1998: Starting with the ERM-crises it ended relatively calm.
Table A2 shows the business cycle synchronisation with Germany during these periods. It
clearly follows that there is no clear-cut relationship between exchange rate stability and
business cycle synchronisation.14
Table A2. Business cycle correlation with Germany in each period.
I II III IV V VI
Austria 0.55 0.68 0.67 0.49 0.68 0.50
Belgium 0.37 0.73 0.60 0.37 0.45 0.40
Canada 0.24 0.73 0.71 0.01 -0.66 0.61
Denmark 0.75 0.77 0.87 0.52 -0.23 0.64
Finland 0.27 0.29 0.53 -0.12 -0.18 0.65
France 0.26 0.81 0.66 0.33 0.55 0.78
Greece 0.15 0.56 0.52 0.32 -0.18 0.16
Ireland -0.08 0.77 0.74 -0.25 -0.20 0.70
Italy -0.28 0.64 0.58 0.07 -0.03 0.42
Japan 0.16 0.87 0.84 0.23 0.49 0.37
Luxembourg 0.62 0.69 0.69 0.42 0.05 0.35
Netherlands 0.79 0.76 0.71 0.00 0.44 0.28
Norway 0.27 0.11 0.54 -0.14 0.06 0.18
Spain 0.23 0.58 0.34 -0.08 0.11 0.70
Sweden 0.52 0.13 0.57 0.22 -0.11 0.68
Switzerland 0.91 0.77 0.72 0.14 -0.01 0.71
United Kingdom 0.60 0.61 0.45 0.20 -0.35 0.63
United States -0.01 0.79 0.60 -0.14 -0.54 0.6315
                                                
Notes
1 The second article is an extension of the first and uses more countries and more sophisticated
measures of exchange rate volatility.
2 Frankel and Rose (1998) find that the more countries trade the more business cycles in these countries
are synchronised. Another relevant study is Fatás (1997).
3 For instance, in their 1997 paper they state that: "our results do not in themselves support an
unequivocal causal interpretation. Whether membership of the ERM itself produced a shift in business
cycle affiliation or whether the shift in business cycle affiliation permitted sustained participation in the
ERM is not settled by our findings." (p. 14).
4 Although our results with respect to the US cycle are somewhat different, we certainly agree with
Artis and Zhang that the business cycle synchronisation of ERM-countries and the US has diminished.
Artis (1999) employs a more extended data period, which also supports the change in business cycle
affiliation vis-à-vis the US.
5 We did not have access to the OECD data as used by Artis and Zhang. Despite several requests, Artis
and Zhang did not make their data available to us.
6 Hodrick and Prescott suggest using  l=1600, but since we use  l =50000 for monthly data  l=5555
seems appropriate
7 Table A1 in the Appendix shows the change in correlation before and after the start of the ERM in
more detail.
8 Table A2 in the Appendix shows the results if the full sample period is split according to the various
phases that can be distinguished in the development of the ERM. A potential drawback of this further
division is that the sub-sample periods may not cover a full business cycle.